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Notes
Availability of Divestiture in Private
Litigation as a Remedy for Violation
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Divestiture is a potent and frequently invoked remedy
in suits by the federal government against corporations
whose growth through stock or asset acquisitions violates
section 7 of the Clayton Act. There is a dearth of author-
ity, however, as to the availability of this remedy in suits
by private litigants. The author of this Note examines
and compares the statutory authority for public and pri-
vate remedies for section 7 violations and considers the
desirability of divestiture as a private remedy. He con-
cludes that section 16 of the Clayton Act may reason-
ably be construed to afford such a remedy and that in
some instances granting such relief would serve both
public and private interests.
INTRODUCTION
American business growth during the last century has been
accomplished to a great extent through intercorporate mergers.
Horizontal integration of competing corporations and vertical
acquisition of subsidiaries by parent corporations through asset
mergers or the acquisition of stock are daily occurrences in our
industrial society. The antitrust laws are premised on a desire
to preserve a free and competitive economy in the midst of this
corporate growth. The most effective remedy available under the
antitrust laws with which to combat mergers having an anti-
competitive effect is divestiture of the stock or assets acquired in
effecting the combination. However, a decree of divestiture often
imposes drastic consequences on the party in violation. A corpo-
rate organization, perhaps of long standing, may be forced to
split up its assets and management; or a sale of stock with severe
tax and price consequences may be required. Nonetheless, in its
recent decision in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.,' the United States Supreme Court, referring to mergers
violative of section 7 of the Clayton Act, pointed out that "the
1. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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very words of § 72 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a
natural remedy."3 Since this statement was made in a case brought
by !he United States, it is express authority for the availability
of divestiture only in section 7 suits brought by the Government.
Despite the significance of divestiture as a remedy under the anti-
trust laws, there is little authority bearing on its availability to
private litigants. The purpose of this Note is to examine the his-
tory and scope of the antitrust laws and the remedies expressly
provided for their enforcement, and in light of this examination
to consider when, if ever, divestiture may be invoked in a suit
by a private litigant for violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
I. PURPOSE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 7
The enactment by Congress of the Sherman Acte in 1890 was
the first legislative step toward the maintenance of an industrial
system composed of large numbers of freely competing units.'
That act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade6 and the monopolization or attempt to monopo-
lize trade or commerce.7 By 1914, however, it was apparent that
although the Sherman Act was an effective weapon against estab-
lished monopolistic practices and competitive restraints, it did
not adequately deal with corporate integrations that might lead to
future monopoly. To attack such mergers in their incipiency," Con-
gress enacted the Clayton Act,9 which prohibited in section 7 the
acquisition by one corporation of another's stock whenever its
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
q. See text accompanying notes 10-13 infra.
S. 866 U.S. at 329.
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. H§ 1-7 (1958).
5. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp.
387, 396 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bicks, Antitrust Goals and Current Enforcement
Programs, 15 U. MiA1V L. Rav. 225 (1961); Loevinger, The Rule of Reason
in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23, 85 (1964). See generally FoRKoscH, ANTI-
TRUST AND THE CONSUMER 32-211 (1956).
6. Section 1, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
7. Section 9, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
8. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). See also S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); ATT'Y GEN.
NAT'L Coam. ANTITRusT REP. 117 (1955); 2 HOFFMANN, ANTITRUST LAW AND
TEcHNIQUES 384 (1963); Bicks, supra note 5; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: a Legislative History, 52 COLUm. L. REV. 766, 768 (1952).
9. 38 Stat. 780 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
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create a monopoly."' Since section 7 prohibits acquisitions that
"may" lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, only a
reasonable probability need be shown that such a result will
occur." Thus the standard of proof required is less than that
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' In 1950, section 7
was amended to apply to asset as well as stock acquisitions."' As
a result of the ability to deal with the anticompetitive effects of
mergers in their incipiency and the lower standard of proof im-
posed under this provision, emphasis has increasingly been placed
on the use of section 7 to promote antitrust policies.'
II. REMEDIES FOR SECTION 7 VIOLATIONS
A. FEDERAL GOVERNENT REMEmDIES
The enforcement of the antitrust laws is largely the responsi-
bility of the federal government acting through the Justice
Department and, in appropriate cases, the Federal Trade Com-
mission.' In such suits the Government may seek criminal penal-
ties, injunctive relief including divestiture, or damages. Although
the criminal provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 14 of the Clayton Act subject convicted parties to
fines up to $50,000 and imprisonment up to one year,' the
Government customarily attacks mergers under section 7 of the
10. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
11. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 823 (1962); United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957); 35 NoTRE DA-um LAw. 265, 266
(1960).
12. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950); How ess~s, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 382; Levi, The du Pont Case and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 3 ANTITRUST Burs. 3 (1958); 35 NoTRE DAaE LAW. 265, 266 (1960).
13. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1950); 4 KAr. L. Rav. 449 (1956). Prior to 1950 section 7
had been construed as inapplicable to asset acquisitions. See Note, Aspects of
Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy, 32 FonHAvm L. REv. 135, 138 (1963). The
amendment also made it clear that section 7 was to apply to vertical as well as
horizontal acquisitions of stock and assets. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), 12 ALA. L. REv. 214 (1960).
14. See Fortas, Small Business, Mergers, and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 39 U. DET. L.J. 200-01 (1961).
15. Under the Sherman Act the Justice Department is given the power of
enforcement. Section 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
Both the Justice Department and the FTC are given the power to enforce the
Clayton Act. See notes 17-18 infra.
16. Criminal sanctions are directly available under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958)
(amendment increased the maximum fine from $5,000 to $50,000). Under sec-
tion 14 of the Clayton Act, a violation of a penal provision of the antitrust
1964] NOTE 269
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Clayton Act. Section 7 is not a penal provision and must be en-
forced by the use of civil remedies. Stock and asset acquisitions
violative of section 7 may be enjoined by the Justice Department
pursuant to section 15 of the Clayton Actu or by the FTC under
section 11.8 Although the Government may recover damages for
its injuries arising from the violation of any antitrust law,o some
form of injunction is the usual request in Government litigation.2 0
The most effective public remedy against a consummated sec-
tion 7 violation is divestiture of the stock or assets acquired" To
laws constitutes a misdemeanor by the individual directors, officers, or agents
of the corporation found to have violated the antitrust laws and may subject
individuals to fines up to $5,000, imprisonment up to one year, or both. 38
Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958). The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962), held that the congressional intent
in enacting section 14 was to make it easier to convict corporate officers and
not to limit the liability of individuals to $5,000. Thus, sections 1 and 9 of
the Sherman Act apply to individuals and may subject them to fines up to
$50,000. See also Whiting, Criminal Antitrust Liability of Corporate Repre-
sentatives, 21 A.B.A. SECTION ANTIrrsT L. 327, 829-33 (1962).
17. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
18. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). Under this
provision authority to enforce compliance is also vested in (1) the ICC where
applicable to common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, (2)
the FTC where applicable to common carriers engaged in wire or radio com-
munication, (3) the CAB where applicable to air carriers subject to the Civil
Aeronautics Act, and (4) the Federal Reserve Board where applicable to banks,
banking associations, and trust companies.
19. Clayton Act § 4A, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1958). Prior
to the 1955 amendment it was generally agreed that while a state could sue
under section 4 of the Clayton Act to recover treble damages, the provision
was not intended to extend to the United States. See Cooper, Treble Damages
-Reward for Private Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws, 32 DicTA 293
(1955). Present section 4A is essentially identical to the private treble damage
provisions of section 4 except that treble damages are not available to the
United States under section 4A. See generally FoRKoscH, ANTITRUST AND THE
Consuca 333-34 (1956); Greenwald, The Measurement of Damages in Pri-
vate Antitrust Suits, 5 ANTITrusT BuLL. 293 (1960).
20. See, e.g., HAMu ToN & TLL, ANTIrUST i AcTIoN 75-77 (TNEC
Monograph No. 16, 1941).
21. Although distinctions may be made between the remedies of dissolution,
divorcement, and divestiture, the term divestiture is broad enough to cover
the other two. Divestiture refers to divesting a defendant of property, securi-
ties, or other assets; divorcement applies to the effect of a decree ordering
particular types of divestiture and is especially applicable to vertically inte-
grated organizations; dissolution refers to any situation where the dissolving
of an illegal combination is involved, including the dissolution of such
combinations by divestiture and divorcement. OPPENEM, CASES ON FEDERAL
ANTI-TausT LAws 885 (1948). See generally Adams, Dissolution, Divorce-
ment, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IN. LJ. 1 (1951).
The exact effect of a divestiture will, of course, be determined by the terms of
the judgment or decree.
270
1964] NOTE 271
effect its purposes a decree of divestiture may even extend to stock
or assets originally acquired for investment purposes which have,
nevertheless, created a situation where competition may be
lessened or monopoly result.22 Until recently, however, courts
showed a marked reluctance to order divestiture2 and, in view
of its drastic effect, the Supreme Court has, in past Sherman Act
cases, refused to grant such relief in the absence of a clear showing
that other methods of enforcement would be ineffective 4 Thus,
the trial court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.," declining to require divestiture of stock, had ordered only
divestiture of voting rights. On appeal,26 du Pont contended that
the order was sufficient to effect the purposes of section 7?F The
Supreme Court considered various forms of injunctive relief, found
them "cumbersome and time consuming" and requiring policing
that would unnecessarily involve the Government in private
affairs, and concluded that "the public is entitled to the surer,
cleaner remedy of divestiture."2 8 The Court commented:
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate
in cases of stock acquisitions which violate § 7. ... The very words of
§ 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy....
Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies.
It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always
be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been
found.29
While only four members of the Court joined in the governing
.2. Thus, a divestiture order may validly require the undoing of acquisi-
tions which did not contravene section 7 at the time they were made. See 35
NoTRE DAM&E LAw. 265, 268 (1960).
28. See ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L CoAMMi. ANTITRUST REP. 353-58 (1955); Howrey,
Advising Clients in the Light of the du Pont (General Motors) Decision, 3
ANTITRUST BULL. 13, 19 (1958); Van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 147 (1950).
24. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593-603
(1951) (concurring opinion); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S.
319 (1947); Adams, supra note 21; Howrey, supra note 28, at 19-23.
25. 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959). On an earlier appeal the Supreme
Court had held that the acquisition between 1917 and 1919 by du Pont of
23% of the common stock of the General Motors Corporation was a violation
of section 7. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
26. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
27. See generally Note, 34 TuL. L. REv. 402 (1960).
28. 366 U.S. at 334. The Court did, however, reject the Government's con-
tention that complete divestiture is mandatory on finding a section 7 violation.
Id. at 328 n.9. See Duke, Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
63 CoLm. L. REv. 1192, 1198-99 (1963).
29. 366 U.S. at 328-31.
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opinion,so their strong language indicates that in Government
actions divestiture is henceforth to be the accepted and normal
remedy for section 7 violations."
Enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department and the FTC has considerable remedial and
deterrent value in maintaining a free competitive economy. How-
ever, the effectiveness of governmental enforcement is severely
limited by a shortage of available funds, and consequently of
manpower.32 Because of this limitation, federal agencies must
select from among suspected violations only a portion - ordi-
narily those involving a nationwide market - for enforcement
action.
B. PRIvATE REMEDIES
In addition to governmental enforcement, private parties in-
jured by a violation of the antitrust laws may obtain treble dam-
ages" and injunctive relief? Y Two purposes are effected by affording
these remedies to private parties: the private party may obtain
compensation for his injury and simultaneously assist the Govern-
ment in enforcing the antitrust laws. 5
30. Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker, and Stewart dissented; Justices Clark
and Harlan took no part in the decision.
31. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Bicks,
supra note 5, at 228. Where another remedy will afford adequate relief against
the anticompetitive effect of the acquisition, it is to be expected that courts
will still stop short of divestiture. See generally Comment, Aspects of Divesti-
ture as an Antitrust Remedy, 32 FoRDHAM L. REV. 135 (1963).
32. See 12 ALA. L. REv. 214 (1960). In 1957, funds for Justice Department
antitrust litigation were limited to about three million dollars per year. Kerr,
Remedies for Violations of Antitrust Laws, 38 Cmr. B. REc. 469 (1957). By
1959, four million dollars per year were available. Wall Street Journal, May 22,
1959, p. 1, col. 6.
83. Clayton Act & 4, 88 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958); Note, 68
YAss L.J. 949 (1959).
34. Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
35. Thus, private parties provide an "ancillary force of private investi-
gators" to supplement the Department of Justice in law enforcement. See
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
221 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1955); Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 595
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd an other grounds, 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962); Weinberg
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Quemos Theatre
Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1940); ATT'Y GEN.
NAT'L Conic. ANTITRUST REP. 378 (1955); FoRKoscH, op. cit. supra note 19, at
17; HAMLTON & TL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 82; Clark, The Treble
Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits,
52 MIcH. L. REv. 363 (1954); Cooper, supra note 19; Greenwald, supra
note 19; Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4
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The remedy most often invoked by private parties injured by
a violation of the antitrust laws is section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which provides that the injured party may recover costs and
attorney's fees as well as three times the damages sustained." This
section provides the private litigant strong incentive to obtain
recompense for his injury, and at the same time aids the Govern-
ment in antitrust enforcement. To recover treble damages he must
show that the antitrust laws have been violated, that he has been
injured, and that the injury has been caused by the violation. 7
Despite an easing of the proof of damages requirement in recent
years,38 the effectiveness of the private treble damage action as a
mode of redressing private harm and enforcing the antitrust laws
is limited by the cost of litigation, difficulty in proving causation,39
and the reliance of most treble damage actions on prior Govern-
ment litigation.o
of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLunA. L. REv. 570, 571 (1964); Comment,
Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YALE LJ. 284, 296 (1939). By
far the greater percentage of antitrust suits are commenced by private parties.
Of 315 antitrust suits pending early in 1959, only 63 were Government suits.
By the end of that year, 600 of the 693 suits pending were private suits. Tim-
berlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble
Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 6 ANriusT BuLL. 441 (1961). Note
the increase in private suits-as of 1940 only 175 private suits were on record.
Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Develop-
ments in Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE LJ. 1010 (1952). Private remedies
have been called an even greater vehicle for the prevention of anticompetitive
activity than governmental enforcement. See Kerr, supra note 32, at 471;
Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTIrusT
Buu.. 167 (1958). See also Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins.
Co., supra at 845; Bicks, supra note 5. The effectiveness of private remedies
has been subject to doubt from other quarters, however, largely due to the cost
of suit, problems of proof, and reliance on prior Government litigation. See
Clark, supra; Comment, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 Yale LJ.
284, 296-99 (1939). See also text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
86. 38 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
37. Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Private Antitrust
Action, 21 A.B.A. SECTION ANTITRUST L., 341 (1962); Timberlake, Federal Anti-
trust Treble Damage Actions, 9 N.YL.F. 145, 172 (1963).
38. Greenwald, supra note 19, at 298.
39. Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296
(1939). If the recent decision in Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F.
Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), is correct, no treble damages can be recovered for
a section 7 violation. The court's reasoning in Gottesman was that since a
section 7 violation proves only that competition may be substantially lessened
or that an acquisition may tend to create a monopoly, it is not a sufficient basis
from which to infer resulting injury to anyone. The correctness of this deci-
sion is subject to some doubt. See BNA's Antitrust & Trade Regulation Re-
port, ATRR No. 127, Dec. 17, 1963 (Subject: Treble Damages Under Section 7
of Clayton Act); 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 597 (1964); 48 Mmn. L. REV. 1001 (1964).
40. The Clayton Act permits a private party to introduce prior
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In addition to treble damages, a private party may obtain in-
junctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act 1 upon a show-
ing of threatened injury for which there is no adequate remedy
at law."
III. DIVESTITURE AS A PRIVATE REMEDY
A private party who has been or will be injured by an acquisi-
tion in violation of section 7 may petition the Government to
bring suit against the parties in violations or seek to intervene in
an existing Government suit." These possibilities, however, are
severely limited because a private party has no right to demand
Government-obtained judgments as prima facie evidence of the defendant's
violation. Section 5, 69 Stat. 283 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). See generally
Cooper, supra note 19. As a result, a large percentage of the private treble
damage actions are brought in the wake of successful Government actions.
See Clark, supra note 85, at 293. The application of the prima facie presump-
tion is limited, however, to those matters with respect to which the judgment
acts as an estoppel between the original parties. This may mean that a prima
facie case is avoided when the time or locality of the violation determined by
the prior judgment differs from that alleged by the private plaintiff. See
Timberlake, supra note 35, at 446-61. The presumption does not apply at all
when the Government litigation resulted in a consent decree or a judgment
rendered on a nolo contendere plea. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 712 (ND. Ill. 196); Note, Government
Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in Private Actions, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1400,
1401 (1952). Acceptance of a plea of solo contendere is within the discretion
of the court and may be refused. See, e.g., United States v. Ultramarine &
Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
41. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). An injunction was not avail-
able to private parties before the enactment of section 16. See Paine Lumber
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917); Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F.
Supp. 595 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962); Note,
Stockholders Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 STAr. L. REV. 480, 483 (1958). By
its nature injunctive relief is not subject to the objections to enforcement of a
section 7 violation raised by Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp.
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), as to treble damages, and it clearly is available for a
section 7 violation. See e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
42. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, A. & P., 80
F. Supp. 888, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). To obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff
must show injury in its private capacity and not merely as a member of the
public. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Frank, 226 Fed. 906 (8th Cir. 1915);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 317 (D. Conn.),
af'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
81 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1948); RCA v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp.
879 (D.N.J. 1934); Connecticut Tel. & Elec. Co. v. Automotive Equip. Co.,
14 F.2d 957 (D.NJ. 1926).
43. See Kerr, supra note 32, at 474.
44. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soe'y of Composers, A. & P., 80
F. Supp. 900, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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that the Government institute an action 5 or to intervene in a
Government suit.:" Also, even though the Justice Department is
equipped to receive complaints from private persons, its limited
resources require it to focus on cases involving nationwide inter-
ests. 7 Despite the general emphasis on market size 8 and the share
of the line of commerce involved,49 section 7 violations clearly
may arise from much less extensive activity.50 Small businesses
operating in an area as limited as a single metropolitan commu-
nity definitely may be the subject of section 7 litigation!" As a
result, private parties frequently must rely on the remedies avail-
able to them, rather than on the Government, to obtain relief from
section 7 violations.
In many situations, however, the private remedies of treble
damages or an injunction prohibiting acquisition will be insuffi-
cient to protect private parties. Treble damages may provide more
than adequate compensation for past injuries, but when the injury
is caused by the exercise of power amassed through illegal acquisi-
tion, the injury will continue so long as the corporation continues
in its anticompetitive state. Neither the public interest in main-
taining free competition nor the private litigant's desire to remain
competitive can be fully vindicated by repeated treble damage
actions. Injunctive relief may prove effective if a proposed acquisi-
tion in violation of section 7 may thereby be prevented, but
reliance on such relief usually is unrealistic, since the injured
party is unlikely to have had advance information of the illegal
acquisition.52 Further, even where the proposed merger is publi-
45. While approximately 1200 complaints were made to the Antitrust
Division in 1956, only 55 cases were filed. Kerr, supra note 82, at 469.
46. Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Develop-
ments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YArm L.J. 1010, 1035-86 (1952).
47. See 68 YALE LJ. 949 (1959).
48. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957).
49. See Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52
Cowni. L. REV. 766, 777 (1952).
50. This is clear since section 7 applies to acquisitions in "any line of
commerce" and "in any section of the country." This language was substituted
for an earlier proposal to prohibit a violation "in any community." The latter
phrase was dropped to prevent the act from extending to the purchase of one
local enterprise by another. Nonetheless, the present language was clearly meant
to cover any substantial market area as well as the nation as a whole. See S. REP.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 8 (1950).
51. Speer, Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws to Small Business in
Michigan, 39 U. DET. L.J. 213, 218 (1961); Whiting, supra note 16, at 837.
52. Compare Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 384 U.S. 110,
128 (1948), in which the Court stated that divestiture "is an equitable remedy
designed in the public interest to undo what could have been prevented had
the defendants not outdistanced the Government in their unlawful project."
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cized, the hesitancy of courts to give preliminary injunctions makes
it highly unlikely that a plaintiff could force a decision on the
merits of the merger prior to its consummation." Similarly, when
the violation involves the acquisition of stock, a decree enjoining
the voting of the acquired stock may sometimes be a sufficient
remedy, but often the temptation to act anticompetitively by buy-
ing each other's products and giving price concessions will continue
as long as the stock connection remains.54
The limited effectiveness of both public and private remedies
for section 7 violations lends significance to an inquiry into the
existence of a further remedy - divestiture in a private suit - to
protect private parties and further the purposes of the antitrust
laws.
A. DIvEsTITumE IPLICIT IN SECTION 7
An inquiry into the availability of divestiture in private litiga-
tion must be rooted in statutory interpretation. 5 Since section 7
prohibits an acquisition of stock or assets which may lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly, the logical consequence of
finding a section 7 violation arguably should be an unwinding
of the prohibited merger." The same concept was expressed by the
Supreme Court in the context of a Sherman Act violation: "Dis-
solution of the combination will be ordered where the creation of
the combination is itself the violation."57 Although this approach
has equitable appeal, it is generally held that where an offense is
proscribed by a statute providing a remedy, that remedy is exclu-
sive. 8 The creation of other remedies under the Clayton Act is,
53. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Fein
v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
54. Of. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
331 (1961).
55. It may be said at the outset that the intent, if any, of Congress on this
issue is sufficiently muddled in the record to preclude helpful resort to any
express statement of purpose. Cf. HAMLTox & TnL, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 10.
56. The language of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
U.S. 316, 328-34 (1961), broadly read, supports this. See text accompanying
notes 28 & 29 supra.
57. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).
See also Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371
U.S. 94, 98 (1962), in which the Court stated that "it is beyond question that
a court of equity has power in appropriate circumstances to order the dissolu-
tion of an association of businessmen, when the association and its members
have conspired among themselves or with others to violate the antitrust laws."
58. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356 (1908); Meyer
v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1936); Hassel v. United States, 34
F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1929); Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23
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therefore, strong evidence of an intent to preclude the implication
of additional remedies from section 7.
B. DIVESTITURE WITIHN SECTION 16
Notwithstanding that the remedy of divestiture might not be
implied from section 7, the logical relation between the two should
be a factor in determining whether section 16 of the Clayton Act,
which authorizes injunctive relief for private litigants, might rea-
sonably be construed to provide a private action for divestiture.
1. Comparison of Section 16 to Provisions Giving the Remedy of
Divestiture to the Government
Section 16 provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws ... when and under -the same conditions
... as injunctive relief against threatened conduct .. . is granted by
courts of equity ... .5
The provision makes no express reference to a power of private
parties to obtain "divestiture." However, divestiture has become
the normal remedy in government suits under section 15 'of the
Clayton Act for section 7 violations notwithstanding that section
15 also contains no express authorization of the remedy."o Sec-
tion 15 provides in part:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with juris-
diction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be
the duty of the . . . Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity
to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by
way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation
shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.e'
Also, divestiture has long been available to the Government under
the substantially identical provisions of section 4 of the Sherman
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1928); cf. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917) (no
injunctive relief available to private parties prior to enactment of section 16).
In A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.S. 248, 252 (1925), the Supreme
Court stated that with one exception the remedies for violation of the Sher-
man Act are exclusive.
59. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
60. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text. See generally Comment,
Aspects of Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy, 39 FoRDHAm L. REV. 135
(1963).
61. 88 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
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Act,," although it too does not expressly authorize the remedy.?
Indeed, the only express grant of divestiture in the antitrust laws
is found in section 11 of the Clayton Act, which confers this power
upon the FTC."
Comparing the right of a private party to sue for "injunctive
relief" under section 16 with the right of the Government to peti-
tion that a "violation ... be enjoined or otherwise prohibited"
under section 15, it would appear that the Government can derive
no greater claim to the remedy of divestiture from the language
of section 15 than can a private party from the language of sec-
tion 16. It is doubtful that the remedy was meant to be conferred
exclusively on the Government by the phrase "or otherwise pro-
hibited," which appears in section 15. Thus, from the language of
the statute, there does not seem to be any reason why divestiture
as a private remedy could not be implied under section 16 if the
other conditions imposed by that section are fulfilled.
2. Analysis of Section 16
In light of the foregoing analysis, divestiture should be avail-
able to private litigants if it is the kind of injunctive relief that
could be "granted by courts of equity" against "threatened con-
duct" as provided by section 16.
(a) General Equity Powers
The classic injunction is couched in preventive terms. The
general equity power to avert loss or harm by preventive injunc-
tions that is incorporated in section 16 clearly allows private
litigants to prevent illegal stock and asset acquisitions. In addi-
tion, however, a substantial body of equity decisions grant injunc-
tions which require that the defendant perform some affirmative
act" For instance, the equitable power to dissolve a corporation
is clear." Thus, unless limited by other language of the provision,
62. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963) (dictum); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 884 U.S. 110
(1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 328 U.S. 173 (1944); Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
63. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
64. 38 Stat. 735 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). "If upon such
hearing the Commission ... shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions
of said sections [15 U.S.C. 4§ 13, 14, 18 & 191 have been or are being violated,
it .. . shall . . . [require] such person to cease and desist from such violations,
and divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or assets, held .. . ."
65. See, e.g., Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 326 Mich. 44, 39 N.W.2d
237 (1949).
66. See Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to
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a court should be able to grant injunctive relief under section 16
requiring the divestiture of stock or assets.
(b) "Theatened Conduct or Loss"
Section 16 permits the grant of an injunction upon the request
of a private party if a court of equity would grant such relief
against "threatened conduct" that will cause loss or damage. If
the grant of equitable power where loss is "threatened" is regarded
as a limitation, the power to deal with stock or asset acquisitions
that have already occurred is perhaps proscribed by negative
implication. That is, since section 16 is couched in preventive
terms, it may be construed to be inapplicable where the acquisi-
tion violative of section 7 has already occurred. Several decisions
have accepted this view. 7 Nevertheless, although it is clear that
these decisions squarely oppose the granting of divestitive relief
under section 16, there is reason to conclude that they have in-
correctly interpreted the statute. They are based on the proposi-
tion that relief against threatened conduct or loss cannot be had
where some loss or conduct that will cause loss has already
occurred, holding in effect that the acquisition of stock or assets
is the sole proscribed event, and that once the acquisition has
occurred no further equitable relief is available. But although the
injurious acquisition of stock or assets occurred in the past, the
injury will continue as long as the acquiring corporation continues
to operate. It is anomalous to allow private parties to prevent
such acquisitions without allowing the same result by divestiture
once a merger has taken place. An interpretation of section 16 to
deny divestiture to private plaintiffs because it is worded in pre-
ventive terms plainly conflicts with the result reached in non-
divestiture cases under section 16. For instance, injunctions
preventing the voting of stock have been granted even though the
original stock acquisition occurred long before an injunction was
requested." Similarly, as seen above, divestiture is often granted
in Government suits despite the seemingly preventive design of
section 15 in providing for "proceedings in equity to prevent and
restrain such violations." 9
Recent decisions lend some support to the proposition that
Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 CoLum. L.
REv. 220 (1940); Note, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 714 (1943).
67. See Continental See. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1926); Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.J.
1941); Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 Fed. 292 (D.N.J. 1918).
68. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1953).
69. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
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divestiture is available to a private litigant under section 16. In
1953 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the
propriety of a temporary injunction prohibiting an acquisition
pending trial without suggesting that the ultimate relief prayed for
- divestiture of stock - was improper.70 Other courts have, in
dictum, suggested that divestiture may be available to private
parties,71 and at least one court refused divestiture only because
it believed that a lesser injunction was sufficient in that cdse."
Finally, a Pennsylvania District Court has held that a complaint
by private litigants for injunctive relief including divestiture of
stock interests stated a good cause of action under section 16 of
the Clayton Act." Of course, these decisions are not clear author-
ity for the availability of divestiture as a private remedy, but in
each one the court was faced at least tangentially with the issue
and did not indicate that divestiture is unavailable under sec-
tion 16.u
In summary, two lines of approach are open to a private party
70. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
71. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, A. & P., 80
F. Supp. 900, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific
Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Hawaii 1948).
72. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F.
Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af'd on other issues, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
It is significant that the court apparently refused divestiture on the authority
of pre-du Pont notions of reluctance to resort to divestitive relief. Id. at 401
n.16. In the du Pont case, the American Crystal Sugar case is cited as the
only clear instance of refusal of divestiture for a section 7 violation. Although
the Court noted that "the authority of that case is somewhat diminished by
the fact that it was brought not by the Government but by a private plaintiff,"
366 U.S. at 330 n.13, it gave no hint that it considered the remedy to be un-
available to private parties.
73. National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
74. Another factor supporting the availability of divestitive relief under
section 16 is that courts construing the antitrust laws often take a broad ap-
proach similar to that used in interpreting constitutional provisions. See
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), in which
the Court said that "as a charter of freedom, the (Sherman] Act has a gen-
erality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions." Of. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962),
in which an injunction was granted although the injunction provisions of sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act do not apply to the "Dealer's Day in Court Act." See
also Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964), in which treble damages were
granted although by the express language of the McCarran Act the treble dam-
ages provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act was inapplicable. Although the
latter decision is based in large measure on the intent of Congress in repealing
section 7 of the Sherman Act, it also evinces a willingness to interpret the
antitrust laws liberally in the light of their underlying purposes. Compare
Rashid, What Is Right With Antitrust, 5 ANTITRUST BuL. 5 (1960).
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seeking divestiture. It would not be unreasonable to imply the
remedy of divestiture from the substantive provisions of section 7,
but in light of the remedies expressly provided in other sections
of the Clayton Act, such an approach probably cannot be sus-
tained. On the other hand, despite some judicial interpretation to
the contrary, divestiture should be available to private litigants
as a kind of injunctive relief allowable under section 16.
C. OBJECTIONS TO DIVESTITURE AS A PRIVATE RE1VIEDY
The argument most likely to arise against granting divestiture
as a private remedy is that it would lead to a flood of indiscrimi-
nate litigation designed to harass competitors.75 This argument is
not well founded since it applies equally to suits for treble damages
and injunctive relief, and since the cost of litigation should deter
most nonmeritorious suits. The objection that the interest of pri-
vate parties may often be inconsistent with the public interest is
also untenable. Private parties have traditionally been granted
remedies under the antitrust laws to aid in their enforcement.
Moreover, since an order of divestiture must be premised upon a
section 7 violation, it will by definition always reflect a finding of
potential public injury.
D. STANDING TO SUE FOR DIVESTITURE
In addition to the practical safeguards against nonmeritorious
suits for divestiture, private suits will be further restricted by the
requirement under section 16 that to be entitled to relief a private
litigant must show threatened loss or damage to himself." Thus
private parties may assume the role of private Attorneys General
in enforcing the antitrust laws77 only where they are personally
affected. The nature of this limitation in any given case will de-
pend upon the context in which the section 7 violation occurs and
the relation between the parties. In the case of a horizontal acqui-
sition by one corporation of the stock or assets of another, the
latter should be required to prove not only a consequent lessening
75. Cf. Minnesota v. Northern See. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 71 (1904).
76. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307,
817 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1958); Connecticut Tel. & Elec.
Co. v. Automotive Equip. Co., 14 F.2d 957 (D.N.J. 1926); Union Pac. R.R.
v. Frank, 226 Fed. 906 (8th Cir. 1915); Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 81 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1948); RCA v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 879 (D.N.J. 1934). Further, a court in its discretion may require the
private plaintiff to prove a greater injury to himself under section 16 than the
standard of section 7 alone would require. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., supra.
77. See note 35 supra.
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of competition or tendency to create a monopoly, but also the
threat of direct losses to itself resulting from such factors as de-
creased ability to compete. In the case of vertical acquisitions, the
acquired corporation could request relief under section 7 only
upon a showing that the acquiring corporation was forcing it
to deal on competitively unfavorable terms. In both cases
acquiescence by the plaintiff corporation in the acquisition would
usually be strong evidence that the acquisition did not directly
injure it.
A competing corporation, however, should be allowed to re-
quest the unwinding of a merger of its competitors if threatened
loss can be shown, regardless of whether the acquisition was hori-
zontal or vertical. A horizontal merger may tend to create a mo-
nopoly which would drive the competitor out of business; a vertical
merger of, for example, a wholesale and a retail corporation might
injure competitors at the wholesale level by capturing actual or
potential retail customers for the merged wholesale corporation,
and at the retail level by the competitive advantage gained by
the merged retail competitor from its affiliation with a wholesaler.78
Further complications in determining standing may develop
when the plaintiff is a corporate shareholder. Although courts
have dismissed individual suits and even class actions by share-
holders on the ground that the alleged injury to the plaintiff was
too remote,"9 stockholders' derivative suits for antitrust violations
have met with some success in recent years.so In general such suits
should be limited to cases where competitive injury to the share-
holder's corporation is clearly proved.8'
E. DIscRETION OF COURTs IN GRANTING DIVETITURE
Even in those cases where the plaintiff can show injury, the
determination that section 16 permits a court to grant divestiture
78. See Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1
(D. Hawaii 1948).
79. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 188 Fed. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). See
also Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 1955);
Note, Stockholders' Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 STAw. L. REV. 480, 481-84
(1958).
80. See Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1958).
81. The present status of stockholders' derivative antitrust suits is dis-
cussed in Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA.
L. Ruv. 148 (1961); of. Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLmm. L. Rzv. 570, 581-88 (1964); Annot.,
Stockholder's Action as Remedy to Recover Damages for Violation of Anti-
trust Laws, 86 AL.R.ad 1845 (1954).
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to private parties in no way requires divestiture in all cases.82 By
incorporating the power of equity courts, section 16 implicitly
confers upon the courts the discretion of equity courts to give the
remedy best suited to the situation. For example, in vertical
acquisitions such as occurred in du Pont, divestiture may be the
only sure method of preventing further anticompetitive dealing.
On the other hand, where one firm acquires the stock of a com-
petitor the necessity of divestiture is by no means as clear. Unless
a potential exercise of control by other means is shown, an injunc-
tion to prevent the voting of the stock by the acquiring corpora-
tion may well be sufficient relief in a suit brought by the acquired
corporation." The express sanction in section 7 of acquisition for
investment purposes reinforces this conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Although there is some case law to the contrary, making the rem-
edy of divestiture available to a private party suing under section
16 of the Clayton Act for violations of section 7 is not an unreason-
able interpretation of its provisions or purposes. The liberal inter-
pretation of the remedial provisions of the antitrust laws and the
recent du Pont decision, indicating that at least in government
suits divestiture is the normal remedy for section 7 violations,
lends support to this view. Though divestiture may seldom be
sought by a private litigant, that is not a ground for denying it
in appropriate cases when requested. Despite the objection that
such a sweeping remedy should not be placed in the hands of
private parties, the public interest as well as the interests of pri-
vate parties would be served by allowing private litigants as well
as the Government to request such relief in a proper case. The
potential for abuse of this remedy by private litigants is mitigated
by the cost of suit, the requirements of proving both a violation
and an injury to the litigant, and the discretion of the court to
determine the appropriateness of divestiture in each case. What-
ever quantum of danger exists will probably cause courts to grant
divestiture more sparingly in private than in Government actions,
but this should not color the determination of whether section 16
creates the remedy. The public interest as well as the interests of
private parties would be served by allowing private litigants to
obtain divestiture in the proper case.
82. In the du Pont case the Court rejected the Government's contention
that once a section 7 violation is found, divestiture must be decreed. United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 & n.9 (1961).
83. Of. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 Fd 738 (2d Cir.
1953).
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